When individuals navigate environments with inconsistent cooperation and competition, cooperation decreases. I theorized that one reason for this tendency is the motivation to avoid contradictions. Based on this theory, I predicted that paradox mindset—the tendency to accept and value contradictions—moderates the degree to which cues of cooperation and competition in a social environment influence perceived cooperation, such that lower levels of paradox mindset are associated with suppressed perceived cooperation. Study 1 found that varsity athletes’ perceptions of the cooperativeness of their team climate were positively associated with cooperative cues, but negatively related to competitive cues, but the latter effect was stronger among those with lower levels of paradox mindset. Study 2 found that these effects generalized to a large cross-cultural sample. In a longitudinal design, Study 3 found evidence for the behavioral implications of suppressed perceptions of cooperation. Stronger cooperative cues increased prosocial workplace behaviors, but only for those with higher levels of paradox mindset. Study 4 found evidence for the full theoretical model in a vignette experiment.

Negotiators sometimes face ultimatums: final offers that they can accept or reject but not negotiate. Ultimatums deny responders the ability to express their preferences or to influence the terms of the deal, thereby undermining responders' perceptions of the fairness of the offer. We introduce the idea of partial ultimatums that involve sending final but incomplete offers to counterparties. Partial ultimatums allow responders to decide on certain terms of the agreement, thereby increasing responders' fairness perceptions relative to regular ultimatums. Studies 3 and 4 experimentally examined the effects of partial ultimatums on negotiation outcomes relative to regular ultimatums. To this this experimentally, we introduced the multi-issue ultimatum bargaining game (MIUB)—a modified ultimatum bargaining paradigm that involves five issues, has integrative potential, and provides negotiators with private information. In two incentivized experiments, partial ultimatums increased agreement rates (from 76.5% to 92% and from 62.9% to 70.5%), joint gain, and individual gain relative to regular ultimatums. These findings emerged with college students in the U.S. and with a cross-cultural sample of English- and Spanish-speakers across eight different countries.

Extant research has typically examined the instrumental effects of being a broker. In this research, we adopt a complementary approach in studying how the frequency with which others in one's network connect them with others (intermediary brokering), incite competition or animosity against others (divisive brokering), and resolve conflicts in your relationship with others (conciliatory brokering) influences well-being. In cross-sectional surveys of students and full-time employees, I found that frequently being a target of intermediary brokering is associated with greater meaning in life. To establish the temporal precedence of the role of brokering, we conducted follow-up longitudinal and experience sampling studies that followed participants over several weeks. We observed a similar pattern of results—the more often one was a target of intermediary brokering at Time t, the greater their perceived meaning in life at Time t + 1, even after controlling for meaning in life at Time t.

One obstacle that might hinder cooperation at work is a mismatch in when people ask for help and when potential help-givers want to be asked for help. In this research, I draw on past findings that a mismatch in what help-seekers and help-givers focus on that suggests that help-givers will prefer for help-seekers to ask for help earlier than they tend to do. Help-givers want to be helpful, but they overlook the discomfort associated with asking for help. Conversely, help-seekers' discomfort prevents them from asking for help until they absolutely need to, but they overlook help-givers' desire to be helpful.